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TEE LIMITS  OF PRUDENTIAL  SUPERVISION:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS, 
INSTITUTIONAL  FAILDRE AND COMPETENCE 
Bernard  Shulll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bank  supervision  typically  receives  little if any attention 
when banks  are operating  without  difficulty.  But when banks  fail 
in large numbers,  or large banks  fail, and the system  itself is 
threatened,  supervision  becomes  a focal point  for criticism  and 
reform  (see, for example,  Conference  Report,  1989, Title  I, IX; 
Pecchioli,  1987, pp.  11 ff.; and Comptroller  General  of the U.S., 
1977).2  On such occasions,  institutional  changes may take equal 
billing  with the  "improvement"  of supervision.  But as often as 
not, the only thing Congress  can agree on is that supervision 
needs to be better.  This usually translates  into more  supervisors 
operating  with more authority, 
The repeated  augmentation  of bank  supervision  may give the 
impression  that it is a solution  rather that a symptom  of 
1  Professor,  Department  of Economics,  Hunter  College,  CUNY. 
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Cleaver  of the Federal  Financial  Institution  Examination  Council, 
and Gerald Hanweck  of George Mason University 
*Unless  otherwise  specified,  commercial  banks,  savings 
associations,  including S&L's and savings banks, credit unions, all 
providing transactions  deposits and subject to more or less similar 
regulation  and supervision,  are referred to as "banks" throughout 
this paper. Holding companies that control these institutions,  and 
are  similarly  regulated  and  supervised,  are,  in  general,  not 
distinguished. recurring  banking  problems;  and it is in the interest  of 
supervisors  to suggest that this is the case. Repeated 
2 
disappointments  about past performance  never  seem to undermine 
the promise  that more and better  supervisors,  with more 
authority,  will make things better  in the future. 
The historical  record suggests that this  is not true. There 
are, however,  independent  reasons  for questioning  whether,  in and 
of itself, more  supervisors  with more restrictive  authority  will 
help very much.  It is argued below that the promise  of 
supervisory  enhancement  is an illusion traceable  to the belief 
that recurring  banking  problems  are caused by bad bankers,  and 
that ignores the limitations  of supervision  in dealing  with the 
problems  that actually  exist. These limitations  include:  (1) the 
existence  of an intractable  economic problem  confronting 
depository  institutions;  (2) at least two distinct  institutional 
failures,  a fragmented  regulatory  system composed  of multiple 
agencies  and the growth  of opportunism  among banking 
organizations,  that make  it difficult  to formulate  and implement 
appropriate  policies;  and, finally,  (3) the inability  of the 
existing  supervisory  establishment  to deal with these economic 
and structural  issues. 
The nature  of supervision  is discussed  in the next  section. 
The limitations  are reviewed  in Section  III, and the inadequacy 
of the current  supervisory  establishment  to deal with the 
problems  it must deal with to be successful  is considered  in 
Section  IV. Some proposals  to remedy the existing  difficulties 3 
are presented  in Section V. These include the consolidation  of 
the  "stand-alone"  supervisory  agencies with the monetary 
authority. 
II.  SUPERVISION  AND  BANKING  PROBLEMS 
Bank  supervision  in a rudimentary  form accompanied  the 
inception  of chartered  banking  in the United  States  (Hammond, 
1957, p.  187).  The early bank charters granted banks  exclusive 
privileges,  particularly  the right to issue notes payable  on 
demand that would  circulate  as currency.  Banks were also 
understood  to be  "private establishments  employed  as public 
agents"  (Dunbar, 1904, p. 91). Among  other things,  they were 
employed  to provide  credit to the government.  A symbiotic  bank- 
government  relationship  implied government  support of one kind or 
another  (Shull, 1983).  Government  supervision  was a logical 
outcome. 
The substance  of the bank-government  relationship  has 
changed  over the past two hundred  years, but special  charters, 
effectively  defining  and limiting banks activities,  still exist; 
and other firms are restricted  in providing  depository  services. 
Banks are still perceived  as serving public  functions,  such as 
participation  in the payments  mechanism,  and are supported  by 
what,  in recent years, has been referred to as a "safety net" 
that includes  deposit  insurance  and the Federal  Reserve's 
discount  mechanism. 4 
A.  Supervisory  Objectives  and Operations. 
The objectives  of supervision  are sometimes  specified  in 
terms  of protecting  depositors,  and/or protecting  the insurance 
funds, and/or protecting  the payments  mechanism  and/or protecting 
the money  supply,  and/or assuring that banks  abide by laws that 
constrain  the private  use of their resources;  e.g. the Community 
Reinvestment  Act.  In general,  each of these objectives  may be 
viewed  as involving  a public  function which banks perform. 
While  it is often said that it is not the purpose  of 
supervision  to keep banks  from failing, these  functions  cannot be 
served by failing or failed banks, particularly  if problems  are 
system-wide.  It is understandable,  then, that supervisors  are not 
simply concerned  with closing  insolvent banks, but also aim at 
sustaining  banks  as viable  institutions.  This objective  is 
reflected  in activities  that range from advice given to bankers 
on how to solve problems,  to financial  aid provided  by the 
supervisory  agencies  (particularly the FDIC and the Federal 
Reserve),  to advocacy by supervisory  agencies  for legal changes 
that are seen as supporting  bank earnings;  e.g., providing  banks 
with the authority  to underwrite  securities  and sell various 
types  of insurance.  Bank capital,  as noted,  is viewed  as a 
protection  against  failure; and earnings  are the basis  for 
increased  capital.  The twin obligations  of supporting  banks  and 
restraining  them, the ultimate  restraint being  closure,  implies  a 
potential  conflict  of objectives  that at best can confuse 
supervisors  in responding  to changing bank and market  conditions. 5 
The functioning  of supervision  has also changed  over the 
past two hundred  years,  from the collection  of sporadic  reports 
to sophisticated  techniques  for monitoring,  evaluation  and 
enforcement.  By the middle  of the Twentieth  Century,  supervision 
had developed  into an examination  of the condition  of banks  on a 
given date, their policy procedures,  and management  competence, 
as well as a determination  of compliance  with applicable  statutes 
and regulation.  (Crosse, 1962, p. 109). At the Federal  Reserve 
Bank of New York,  for example,  the principal  concerns  were that 
banks would have  sufficient  liquidity to meet their  contractual 
obligations  to provide  funds, that they have sufficient  capital 
to prevent  the threat  of insolvency  in the face of potential 
losses, and that they have sufficient  earnings  to absorb  losses 
and raise new capital when needed  (Crosse, 1962, p. 158). 
Currently,  the principal  work of the supervisory  agencies 
include the establishment  of regulations  in accordance  with  law, 
and the evaluation  of "safety and soundness"  of the institutions 
supervised.  When a bank's  condition  is deemed  "weak" or 
"troubled;"  i.e., approaching  insolvency,  they attempt to bring 
about improvements;  and, if unsuccessful,  are expected  to close 
the bank promptly.  The principal  tool of the supervisory  agencies 
is bank examinations. 
In recent years, with the collapse  of the S&L industry,  the 
high rate of commercial  bank  failure, and the depletion  of the 
the FDIC's  deposit  insurance  funds, there have been  some notable 
changes  in supervisory  technique.  There has been movement  toward 6 
measuring  the net worth of banks  on a market,  rather than a book, 
basis,  toward  adjusting  capital  requirements  to risk, and 
incorporating  interest-rate  risk measures  and interest-rate 
change  scenarios  into supervisory  calculations  (Houpt t Embersit, 
1991). But a principal  legislative  remedy,  as has typically  been 
the case, has been more  supervision  and tougher  constraints, 
including  earlier  intervention  and closure  of weak banks.  This 
approacy  derives  from the venerable  idea that bank management  is 
almost  invariably  responsible  for bank  failure. 
B.  Bank  Management,  Supervision  and  Bank  Failure 
Mismanagement  as a cause of bank  failure was a recurrent 
theme  in the 19th and early 20th Centuries  (Legislative History, 
1855, pp. 58 ff.; House Committee  on Banking  C Currency,  1913, 
pp.  11, 31).  (For an early example  of the incipient  "supervisory 
attitude,"  see Hammond,  1957, p. 201). It has emerged  repeatedly 
in studies by supervisory  agencies  in a succession  of banking 
problems  and crises over the last 70 years.  In 1926, Federal 
Reserve  officials  identified bad management  as a principle  cause 
of the high rate of bank  failure  (Friedman & Schwartz,  1963, pp. 
269-70).  In 1930, the Comptroller  of the Currency  reported 
roughly half the failures  of national banks then in receivership 
could be attributed  to incompetent  management  and dishonesty, 
while the other half could be attributed  to local financial 
depression  (Comptroller of the Currency,  1930, pp.  307-321).  The 
economist  Walter  Spahr epitomized  the "supervisory  attitude"  when 
he wrote that  "it is probably  not possible  to separate 7 
(the)  .  .  . failures  due to incompetent  management  from those due to 
local business  depressions  since it is the purpose  and test of 
good bank management  to avoid the effects  of local financial 
depressions"  (Spahr, 1932, p. 220). This appears to have been the 
view of the Federal  Reserve  which,  in the early years  of the 
Great Depression,  again found bad management  to be principally  at 
fault for bank  failures  (Friedman & Schwartz,  1963, p.358-59). 
In the mid-1970's,  the reemergence  of large bank  failures 
evoked the traditional  supervisory  response.  The Federal  banking 
agencies  again pointed  to inept management  and/or  fraudulent 
practices  as the principal  cause  (First Meeting  on the Condition 
of the Banking  System,  1977, pp.  1022-1025,  1077-1081,  1154- 
1167). In the early  1980's, the FDIC discounted  the significance 
of regional  economic  problems  and found mismanagement  to be the 
most  important  cause of bank  failures  (FDIC, 1984, p. 13). In the 
late 1980's, the Comptroller  indicated  a "long held belief"  that 
bank management  and boards  of directors  bear ultimate 
responsibility  for bank problems  and that management-driven 
weakness  were the underlying  cause of most  of the bank  failures 
studied  (Comptroller of the Currency,  1988, p. 1). 
It is an small step from identifying  management  deficiencies 
as a principal  cause of bank  failure to finding that  supervision 
needs to be improved.  The currently  active Federal  agencies 
provide  a living historical  record of the continuing  efforts  to 
provide  such improvement.  The perceived  deficiencies  of state 
bank  supervision  was an important element  in passage  of the 8 
National  Banking Act  in 1863 and the establishment  of the Office 
of the Comptroller  of the Currency  (OCC) (Robertson, 1968, pp. 
42-52). Reviewing  a succession  of banking  crises  in the latter 
half of the  19th Century under National  Banking Act,  the National 
Monetary  Commission  complained  in 1912 that  "(w)e have no power 
to enforce  the adoption  of uniform  standards with regard to 
capital,  reserves,  examinations  and the character  and publicity 
of reports  of all banks  in different  sections  of the country" 
(National Monetary  Commission,  1912, p.  9). An explicit  purpose 
of the Federal  Reserve Act of 1913 was "to establish  more 
effective  supervision  of banking  in the United  States."  It 
extended  Federal  supervision  to state  (member) banks. 
The massive  bank  failures  of the early  1930's were 
attributed  by many both to inadequate bankers  and inadequate 
supervision.  W.F. Gephart,  of the First National  Bank of St. 
Louis,  reflected  a common sentiment when he wrote  in the American 
Economic  Review  in 1935: 
"For many decades,  the states and even the federal 
government  have permitted  banks to be organized  with 
small capital...  and by individuals  with no banking  or 
business  experience  to qualify them to conduct  a 
banking  business....Chief  reliance has...been  placed  on 
bank examinations....In  many cases, these examiners 
were  less qualified  for their  jobs than the bankers 
were  for theirs"  (Gephart, 1935, p. 84). 
The measures  required  to remedy the "constitutional  weaknesses" 
of the system,  as seen by the Senate Banking  Committee  in 
reporting  the Glass Bill to the full Senate in May  1933 have a 
familiar  ring: 9 
"(a) Strengthen  the capital of banks;  (b) Provision  for 
closer and stronger  supervision;  (c) More careful  restriction  of 
investments.  (d) Requirements  for the truthful  valuation  of 
assets.  (e) Protection  of depositors  and limitation  of their 
losses through  a bank deposit  insurance  corporation"  (Senate 
Banking  Report,  1933, p.11). 
The FDIC was established  in the early  1930's not simply to 
provide  deposit  insurance, but to further extend  an upgraded 
Federal  supervision  to state  (insured) banks;  and the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System  (FHLBS) was established  to provide  Federal 
supervision  for the reorganized  savings and loan industry. 
In more  recent years, the National  Credit Union 
Administration  (NCUA) was established  (1970) to provide  Federal 
supervision  for credit unions. And the Federal  Financial 
Institution  Examination  Council  (FFIEC) was organized  in 1977 as 
a coordinating  agency to improve the "improved"  supervision 
provided  by the other Federal  agencies. 
Comprehensive  banking  reform, typically  including  improved 
supervision,  has typically  evoked a transcendent,  and in 
retrospect,  unwarranted  optimism.  For example,  the Comptroller  of 
the Currency  announced  in 1914 that, with the new Federal  Reserve 
Act,  "financial  and commercial  crises,  or 'panics,'...with  their 
attendant  misfortunes  and prostrations,  seem to be mathematically 
impossible"  (Comptroller of the Currency,  1914, p.  10).  Seventy- 
five years  later, confronting  the S&L disaster  with yet another 
comprehensive  reform, the Financial  Institutions  Reform,  Recovery 
and Enforcement  Act  (FIRREA), the Secretary  of the Treasury 
(Nicholas Brady) proclaimed  "(t)wo watch words guided  us as we 10 
undertook  to solve this problem--Never  Again"  (Brady, 1989,  p.l). 
C. Recent Banking  Reform 
Notwithstanding  its general  emphasis  on liquidating 
insolvent  S&L's and regulatory  reorganization,  a stated purpose 
of FIRREA  was  "(t)o promote  .  .  .,  a safe and stable  system of 
affordable  housing;"  i.e., to sustain the public  functioning  of 
savings  associations.  It increased the requied proportion  of 
assets to be held by S&L's in loans and securities  related to 
residential  housing  (qualified thrift  lender test; Title  III, 
Sec. 301); and it established  two new subsidized  housing  programs 
(Title VIIA,  Sec. 721). 
FIRREA provided  for the liquidation  of failed savings 
institutions  through  the Resolution  Trust Corporation  (RTC). It 
abolished  the Federal  Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal 
Savings  & Loan  Insurance Corporation  (FSLIC), transferred 
supervisory  authority  over savings associations  to a newly 
established  Office  of Thrift  Supervision  (OTS) in the Treasury 
and established  a new Savings Association  Insurance  Fund  (SAIF) 
to be administered  by the FDIC. Dspite  its emphasis  on "picking 
up the pieces"  and reorganization  of the S&L regulatory 
structure,  FIRREA  did not neglect  the public  functions  of S&L/s. 
FIRREA  also included major changes  in supervision  that 
affected  not only savings associations  but other depository 
institutions  and bank holding  companies.  In general,  it tightened 
constraints  on Federal  savings associations,  extended  Federal 
constraints  to state-chartered  associations,  and imposed  other 11 
restrictions  applicable  to national  and member banks. 
Specifically,  among other things,  it prohibited  savings 
associations  from the acquisition  and retention  of junk bonds, 
and limited their equity  investments  (Title II, Sec. 222).  It 
raised their  capital  requirements  to levels no less stringent 
than those  applicable  to national banks  (Title III, Sec. 301) and 
imposed National  Bank and Federal  Reserve Act  limits on lending 
to one borrower,  lending to insiders  and on interaffiliate 
transactions  (Title III, Sec. 301). It prohibited  certain 
activities  to institutions  not meeting  capital  requirements 
("troubled institutions");  these prohibitions  include  accepting 
brokered  deposits,  offering  above-market  interest  rates on 
deposits,  lending to business  development  corporations, 
increasing  assets,  and, for state associations,  exercising 
"expanded powers"  permitted  under  state law. The FDIC was given 
"backup enforcement  authority"  over all savings associations, 
permitting  it to intervene  in situations  representing  a risk to 
the insurance  funds. 
In addition,  FIRREA  augmented  the authority  of all the 
Federal  agencies  to ferret out potential  problems,  impose timely 
restrictions  and discipline  recalcitrant  bank  officials  (Title 
IX). For example,  it expanded  agency authority  to appoint  a 
conservator  on the determination  that a bank  is unsafe  or 
unsound,  or that it has  "willfully"  violated  an order issued 
against  it. It expanded  agency authority  to remove bank 
officials,  and to order restitution  for violations  of law or 12 
regulation.  The agencies  were given veto power  over new directors 
and senior executive  officers  of relatively  new banks,  banks 
experiencing  recent change  in control and those not meeting 
capital  requirements.  It provided  for substantial  civil money 
penalties,  up to $1 million  per day, for violating  written 
agreements  or orders,  or for filing false or misleading  reports. 
It also beefed  up criminal penalties  and appropriated  additional 
funds to the Department  of Justice to undertake  civil and 
criminal prosecutions.  (For a discussion,  see Siedman,  1990). 
The new powers  to discipline  and penalize  banks  did not 
prevent  high  levels of commercial  bank failure  in 1990 and 1991, 
or the emerging  insolvency  of the Bank  Insurance Fund  (BIF). 
Comprehensive  reform was again proposed  by the Treasury  in 1991 
(Treasury Report),  and an "Administration  bill," based  on the 
Report,  was introduced  in Congress.  The bill provided  for the 
recapitalization  of the Bank  Insurance Fund  (BIF); it included 
measures  to relax restrictions  on interstate branching,  lift 
restrictions  on securities  and insurance  activities,  and permit 
ownership  of bank holding  companies by commercial  firms.  It 
contained  measures  to further modify  supervision. 
The Act that was passed,  the Federal  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation  Improvement  Act of 1991  (FDICIA), did not adopt the 
Administration's  proposals  on branching,  new activities  or 
holding  company  ownership,  measures  expanding  bank powers,  aimed 
at increasing  bank market value  and, in general,  extending 
deregulation.  It did, however,  reaffirm the public  interest  in 13 
banks by recapitalizing  the insurance  funds and, among other 
"public function"  measures,  providing  depository  institutions 
with an incentive  to offer  "lifeline banking  accounts"  and to 
make  loans in "distressed  communities"  (Title II, Sets. 231-34). 
It augmented  supervision  in a number  of ways: by requiring 
Federal  supervisors  perform  additional  on-site bank examinations 
and through  annual  independent  audits for larger institutions 
(Title I, Secs.lll-12);  by giving  supervisors  authority  to 
prescribe  and enforce  detailed managerial  and operational 
standards  for purposes  of "safety and soundness"  that seem to run 
the gamut  from loan documentation  to compensation  for tellers; 
and by further  extending  Federal  authority  to state banks by 
imposing  the limits on insurance underwriting  and equity 
investments  applicable  to national banks  (Title III, Sec. 303). 
FDICIA  coupled the reaffirmation  of public  interest  in banks 
and the augmentation  of supervision  with the requirement  that 
rules be substituted  for discretion  in evaluating  bank  condition 
and dealing  with weak institutions.  Past agency practice  had 
supported  large banks  deemed  "too big to fail." FDICIA  restricted 
such policies  by prohibiting  the FDIC from extending  insurance 
coverage  to uninsured  creditors  after 1994 unless  the President, 
the Secretary  of the Treasury  and the FDIC  jointly determine  that 
doing  so involves  a "least cost" resolution  or that there  is a 
systemic  risk.  In the latter case, the Congressional  banking 
committees  must be notified  (Title I, Sec. 141). FDICIA  further 
restricted  the Federal  Reserve  from lending to "undercapitalized" 14 
institutions  unless the institution  were certified  "viable" by 
its Federal  bank  supervisory  agency.  If a "certified"  institution 
to whom the Federal  Reserve makes  loans were subsequently  to 
fail, with  losses to the insurance  fund, the Federal  Reserve 
Board could  incur a liability to the FDIC  (Title I, Sec. 142). 
FDICIA  further  limits supervisory  discretion  on a case-by- 
case basis through  what has been termed  "prompt corrective 
action,"  involving  the imposition  of escalating  constraints  on 
undercapitalized  banks  (Title I, Section  131). In an elaboration 
of the  "troubled  institution"  category  of FIRREA,  five 
capitalization  categories  are established:  "well-capitalized," 
"adequately  capitalized,"  "undercapitalized,"  "significantly 
undercapitizlized,"  and "critically-undercapitalized."  A 
determination  by the relevant  federal supervisory  agency that a 
bank  is in one of the lower three categories  automatically 
triggers  the requirement  that it submit an acceptable  capital 
restoration  plan.  "Undercapitalized"  banks  failing to submit and 
implement  an acceptable  plan are subject to constraints  on asset 
growth,  non-traditional  activities,  transactions  with affiliates, 
and deposit  rates of interest,  among others. Those  "critically 
undercapitalized"  are subject to additional  constraints  and, 
under the law, must be closed promptly. 
Despite  the establishment  of "prompt corrective  action," 
discretionary  authority  remains  for the agencies  in key areas.  In 
defining  the five categories,  FDICIA  specifies  the use of both  a 15 
leverage  and a risk-based  capital  requirement.3 It also 
specifies  a minimum  requirement  for "critically  undercapitalized" 
institutions;  the agencies must  impose a leverage  requirement  of 
tangible  equity-to-total  assets of not less than 2 percent,  and 
not more than  65 percent  of the minimum  leverage  requirement 
established  (by the agencies)  for "adequately  capitalized"  banks. 
But within  these  legislated  limits, the federal  supervisors  have 
been given  authority  to develop the capital  adequacy  thresholds 
that activate  supervisory  constraints.4  Even the required 
closing  of a "critically  undercapitalized"  bank,  is subject to 
agency-determined  exceptions;  it need not be closed  if the bank's 
federal  supervisor  and the FDIC  jointly determine  that  it has an 
acceptable  capital  restoration  plan and is viable. 
It was recently  noted that  'I..  .the regulators  have opted  for 
a narrow  definition  of 'undercapitalized'  that sticks  less than 
3The "leverage"  requirement  refers  to the  ratio  of tangible 
equity  capital-to-total  assets.  Tangible  capital  excludes 
intangibles,  principally  "goodwill;"  equity  capital  is  the 
principal  component  of what has been  termed  "Tier  1"  (or "core") 
capital  and distinguished  from "supplementary  capital,"  including 
subordinated  debt, loan loss allowances and preferred  stock  ("Tier 
2").  The  risk-based  capital  requirement  currently  derives  from  a 
weighing  of the  credit  risk  in specific  types  of assets  on bank 
balance  sheets  and  in  off-balance  sheet  items,  such  as  standby 
letters  of  credit.  FDICIA,  however,  requires  the  Federal 
supervisory  agencies  to  augment  their  risk-based  capital 
computations by developing interest rate risk, "concentration"  risk 
and  "non-traditional  activity"  risk  components  (Title III,  Sec. 
305). Advanced notice of changes, subject to comment, was issued in 
July, 1992  (Federal Reserve Board,  "Press Release,"  July 30 1992). 
Final  regulations  are to go into effect  in mid-1993. 
4The final rules,  including  the definitions  developed  by the 
federal  supervisory  agencies,  were  issued  in  September  1992  and 
went into effect  on December  19, 1992. 16 
5%  of the industry with the unwanted  label." Andrew  Hove, 
Chairman  of the FDIC, was reported to have acknowledged  that  "We 
could have  set the capital  levels a lot higher"  (Rehm, American 
Banker,  December  2, 1992). 
The establishment  of rules for dealing  with weak banks  can 
be seen as an effort to encourage  higher  levels of capital  and 
provide  a basis  for further deregulation.  Risk-adjusted  deposit 
insurance  premiums  and risk-adjusted  capital  requirements  (both 
required by FDICIA)  are aimed at reducing  incentives  for 
excessive  risk-taking  emanating  from government  support through 
deposit  insurance,  forbearance,  and "too-big-to-fail"  policies. 
Closure  rules run parallel  by precluding,  for the most part, bank 
operations  with  little or no capital  (at least on a book basis). 
If risk-adjustment  and closure  rules can effectively  neutralize 
undesirable  incentives  and, thereby,  limit FDIC and tax-payer 
exposure,  regulatory  restrictions  on bank activities  should not 
be needed  to curb excessive  risk-taking.  With Federal  support  for 
large banking  organizations  curtailed by restrictions  on "too- 
big-to-fail,"  the growth  of large organizations  through 
interstate  branching  and merger  should not derive  from unfair 
advantages  in capital markets  or further expose the insurance 
funds. 
Whether  the specific  rules established  by FDICIA  (or any set 
of rules) can be effective  in protecting  the insurance  funds and 
taxpayers,  without  jeopardizing  other public policy  objectives, 
are questions  that have yet to be fully examined.  Any  system of 17 
rules raises the specter  of a deus ex machina  that unthinkingly 
closes  (or keeps open) large numbers  of banks  on the basis  of 
arbitrary  calculations  that can have little relationship  to bank 
condition. 
On close examination,  however,  FDICIA  establishes  "rules" 
over  "authorities"  in a illusory way.  In fact, the legislation 
provides  the authorities;  that is, the federal  supervisory 
agencies,  with enormous  discretion.  They have been authorized  to 
establish  standards  for bank management  that extend  into areas 
that had long been considered  management  prerogatives.  They have 
been directed  to visit and examine banks more often;  and to 
implement  legislative  provisions  requiring  considerably  more 
rule-making  and regulation-writing.  In the case of weak banks, 
they have been given the power to establish,  for the most part, 
the  "rules"  for activity  restrictions  and closure which, 
presumably,  may be changed  if, in their discretion,  it seems 
reasonable  to do so. Even in restricting  "too-big-to-fail" 
policies,  Congress  left the door open for discretion.  (The 
supervisors  may, nevertheless,  find it advantageous  in dealing 
with bank  officials  to emphasize  that they now have  less 
flexibility  to go easy on undercapitalized  banks). 
In the venerable  "rules vs. authority"  debate  on the conduct 
of monetary  policy,  the establishment  of a "rule" for money 
growth was to be through  legislation  that would tie the hands  of 
the central bank, eliminate  "fine-tuning,"  and even permit  its 
reorganization  as a small agency,  largely composed  of 18 
technicians.  FDICIA,  on the other hand, calls  for more, not  less 
agency  activity  and "fine-tuning."  Larger, not smaller,  agencies, 
are a result.  In mid-1992,  the Comptroller  announced  that to meet 
the more  frequent bank examination  requirements  of the Act, he 
soon would hire  300 additional  bank examiners,  and another  300 in 
1993  (Comptroller of the Currency,  May 27, 1992). In fact, all 
the Federal  agencies  have substantially  expanded  their  staffs 
over the past year and project  further substantial  increases  in 
1993  (Rehm, American  Banker,  December  2, 1992). 
FIRREA  and FDICIA  reflect well-established  trends  and 
tendencies  in banking  legislation,  including  the expansion  of 
supervisory  authority  to meet bank  failure problems  and the 
extension  of Federal  supervision  to state banks.  "Prompt 
corrective  action"  is also consistent  with the historic  tendency 
to expand  supervision.  The operational  questions  raised  concern 
the capacity  of supervisors  to "co-manage"  as opposed  to monitor 
and "nurse" sick banks;  and the capacity  of a more  constrained 
bank management  to raise capital and sustain traditional  lending 
functions.  The strategic  questions  concern  a seeming  failure to 
recognize  the inherent  limitations  of supervision.5 
5While not discussed here, it is worth noting that limitations 
of the supervisory  process would also support proposals  to confine 
the  Federal  "safety  net"  to  "minimal  banks"  in  which  safety  is 
assured by asset restrictions.  See Litan,  1987, Ch. 5 and Pierce, 
1991, Ch.5. 19 
III.  LIMITATIONS 
The reform of supervision  in recent legislation  reflects  the 
failures  of supervision  over the last decade.  It continues  to 
focus on misguided,  inept and dishonest  bank management  as the 
principal  cause of bank  failure.  It does not address  the inherent 
deficiencies  in the supervisory  process  that have contributed  to 
the historical  record of repeated  failure. 
A.  Monetary  Policy  and Exogenous  Shock 6 
It has long been understood  that banks  are vulnerable  to 
macro-economic  disruption.  It is somewhat  less widely  recognized 
that banks may also be vulnerable  to monetary  policy  designed  to 
ameliorate  disruptions.  The Federal  Reserve  appears to have been 
cognizant  of the latter from the early  1920's when  it began to 
use open market  operations  as a tool of policy. 
(1) Federal  Reserve  Policy.  When the Federal  Reserve  was 
established,  the discount  window was much more actively  used than 
it is currently.  Discounts  and advances  as a proportion  of 
Federal  Reserve  credit reached a peak of 82 percent  in 1921; in 
1929 they were still over 60 percent.  During the 1920's, the 
proportion  of member banks borrowing  from the Reserve  Banks was 
consistently  around  60 percent  (Shull, 1971, pp. 36-38). 
The Federal  Reserve's  view of supervision  reflected  its 
position  as a creditor,  and also its understanding  that the 
6This  section  is  adapted  from  Hanweck  &  Shull,  1992  which 
provides  a  review  of  the  literature  and  empirical  tests  of 
hypotheses that monetary surprise and exogenous shock substantially 
affect the condition  of banks. 20 
credit  it extended  was intended, by Congress,  to serve the  "needs 
of trade;"  i.e., to provide  commercial  banks with  funds that 
would be extended  to business  in the form of short-term  credit 
for current  operations.  The Reserve  Banks, therefore,  needed  to 
8,  .  .  . be acquainted  with the loan policies  and credit extensions  of 
their member  banks...."  (Federal Reserve Board,  1923, p. 35). 
In the early  1920's, monetary  policy was transformed  from 
the provision  of credit at the discount  window,  on the demand  of 
banks having  short-term  commercial  paper eligible  for discount, 
to recurrent  pressure  on bank reserves  implemented  through  open 
market  operations.  This transformation  required new constraints 
on borrowing  at the discount_window.  A set of non-price  rationing 
rules,  limiting  use of the discount  window to short-term 
borrowing  for unanticipated  outflows  of funds, were developed; 
banks were encouraged  to be "reluctant to borrow;"  i.e., the Fed 
"turned to  'gadgets'  and conventions...without  any overt 
alteration  of the law"  (Keynes, 1930, pp. 239-40).' 
The reformulation  of monetary  policy,  of necessity  involved 
a reevaluation  of supervision.  Like other bank  supervisors,  the 
Federal  Reserve  might  focus on the integrity  and competence  of 
bank management,  the adequacy  of bank capital  in light of past 
'There is an irony in the Federal Reserve's  encouraging  banks 
to be reluctant  to borrow  that corroborates  Keynes'  perception  of 
what the Federal Reserve was doing. An important aim of the Federal 
Reserve  Act  of 1913 had been  to promote  the  secondary  market  for 
commercial paper and to overcome the reluctance of banks to borrow. 
In establishing  the discount  window,  few restrictions,  other than 
those required to define "commercial paper," were initially imposed 
by the Act and by the Federal Reserve  (Hackley, 1973, Chs. 2,3). 21 
experience,  and the bank's  current condition.  But it would  also 
have to consider  whether banks had the capacity  to meet 
predictable  needs  for funds without  reliance  on the window,  and 
other unexpected  needs  for funds with only short-term  reliance  on 
the window.  If not, do they have sufficient  capital  to absorb the 
losses they might  incur as the result of monetary  restraint. 
The compelling  need to supervise with these questions  in 
mind  could be traced to recognition  of a potential  bind  in 
exerting  monetary  restraint.  If many banks  or important  banks  did 
not have the capacity  to tolerate  the pressure  imposed, the 
Federal  Reserve  would have the choice of maintaining  restraint 
and permitting  banks to fail, or easing restraint  and abandoning 
the objectives  of the policy  it had adopted;  e.g., price 
stability. 
The problem  was addressed  through  a supervisory  policy  that 
served as a companion  to its new discount  policy.  The lessened 
availability  of discount  credit to meet reserve drains,  some at 
least imposed by monetary  restraint,  implied that banks  would 
have to maintain  higher  levels of liquidity  and/or capital  to 
meet the new needs.  The new supervisory  policy  was,  in part, 
implemented  through  discount  window  surveillance  where,  with 
about  60  percent  of member banks typically  indebted,  discount 
officials  could  influence bank behavior.' 
*In  the aftermath of the great depression, the discount window 
became  far less important to banks as a source of reserves than in 
the  1920's.  In the  1950's,  the development  of alternative  sources 
of short-term  funds,  first through  the  federal  funds market,  and 
associated  with  the decline  in bank holdings  of government  debt, 22 
Elements  of the Fed's distinctive  supervisory  policy  over 
the past  40 years can be seen in its approach to capital 
adequacy.  An  "adjusted  risk asset" approach was originally 
adopted by the Federal  Reserve Bank of New York in 1952. In 1956 
a liquidity  test was added that required more  capital  from banks 
which were  less liquid  (Crosse, 1962, pp.  173 ff.). The Board 
amended  its capital  adequacy  approach  in 1972 to consider  the 
experience  of banks  in the 1969-70 period  of disintermediation 
(Vojta, 1973, p. 11; see Appendix  2 for the revised ABC  form 
developed  by Board).  The Board's  approach has sometimes  been 
contrasted  with that of the Comptroller  of the Currency  who 
deemphasized  "ratio analysis"  in favor of general  guidelines 
II  .  .  . appropriate  for banks  operating  in normal  conditions"  (Vojta, 
1973, p. 11). 
In general  terms, the policy problem  confronting  the Federal 
Reserve,  and distinguishing  its supervisory  efforts  from that of 
other supervisory  agencies,  can be briefly  described  as follows: 
(1) the condition  of banks will be affected by unexpectedly 
intense monetary  restraint  and/or other exogenous  shocks;  (2) the 
degree  of restraint  that can be imposed by monetary  policy may be 
affected by worsened  conditions  of banks developing  out of the 
surprise  or shocks;  and  (3) if policy  is eased because  the 
condition  of banks worsens,  the inflation  rate will rise; but  if 
pressure  is sustained,  the bank  failure rate will rise. 
made  supervision  through  the  window  less  effective.  These 
developments  did not,  however,  change  the need  for a supervisory 
policy  coordinated  with monetary  management. 23 
(2)  Surprise  and  Shock.  It seems likely that bank 
managements  are now well aware of the problems  created by 
alterations  in Federal  Reserve policy,  and have adjusted  their 
operations  accordingly,  at least within the limits of their 
experience.  Nevertheless,  unanticipated  changes,  whether 
emanating  from sudden and drastic  shifts in monetary  policy 
(monetary surprise)  or from exogenous  shocks to bank-sensitive 
sectors  and markets,  may still produce  an escalation  of pressure 
to which banks  are unable to adjust quickly. 
The onset of a shock may be due to the inability  of one or 
more  large banks to replace volatile  liabilities  (e.g., 
Continental  Illinois,  1984; Bank of New England,  19901, with many 
other banks  excessively  exposed. A similar  shock may be generated 
by severe monetary  restraint  to control  inflation  that abruptly 
elevates  market  rates of interest and pushes banks  into 
insolvency  (e.g.,1979-82). The imposition  of severe monetary 
restraint  in the early  1980's, and the rise in bank  failure  rates 
during the last decade has indicated  just how vulnerable  banks 
can be. 
"Shocks,"  such as defaults by major  classes  of borrowers, 
become  increasingly  likely during  long periods  of prosperity 
without  crises  (Minsky, 1957, pp.  181-187; Minsky,  1971, pp. 
114-117; Guttentag  & Herring,  1986, pp. l-5; 1988, p.  607). 
During  such periods,  which may appear to be characterized  by 
successful  monetary  policy,  the banking  system  is likely to 
become  increasingly  "fragile," with institutions  "excessively 24 
exposed"  to insolvency  (Minsky, 1971; Guttentag  C Herring, 
1986).'  And ultimately,  monetary  policy will be constrained 
the fragility  of the system. 
Shocks have been defined  as low probability  hazards 
by 
carrying  high potential  costs  (Guttentag & Herring,  1986, pp. 2, 
32-33).  It has been observed that  "the continuing  potential  for 
credit crunches  has usually been underestimated...."  And  at the 
same time,  it is not possible  to know before  the event when or 
how hard  it is going to hit  (Kaufman, 1991). Bank management, 
then, will have no basis  on which to calculate  probabilities;  the 
events,  in Davidson's  terms,  do not emerge  from an ergotic 
process  (Davidson, 1988, pp. 332-33;  see also, Davidson,  1991). 
Even  in the case where management  took an "outside observers" 
view and attached  a "prudent" probability  to such possibilities, 
competition  could drive the institution  from the market.  In these 
circumstances,  rational  expectation  and efficient  market  axioms 
do not app1y.l' 
'Hyman  Minsky recognized such institutional  changes early. "If 
during  a  long  prosperity,  monetary  policy  is  used  to  restrain 
inflation,  a  number  of..  .velocity-increasing  and  liquidity- 
decreasing  money-market  innovations  will  take  place....these 
compounded  changes  will  result  in  an  inherently  unstable  money 
market  so  that  a  slight  reversal  of  prosperity  can  trigger  a 
financial  crisis  (Minsky,  1957,  p.  184).  Examples  of  excessive 
exposure  from  the  1960's  to  the  1980's  are  readily  available 
(Minsky, 1986, pp. 51 ff; Guttentag  & Herring,  1986, pp.  16 ff.). 
"This  is not  to  suggest  that  policy  will  have  no  effect  if 
changes  are  anticipated.  There  is  evidence  that  the  Federal 
Reserve's  relief  of seasonal  pressure  on banks  in the  1920's, by 
definition  an  anticipated  pressure,  had  a  significant  effect  in 
reducing the frequency and severity of the banking  crises that had 
plagued  the  economy  in  the  late  19th  and  early  20th  Centuries 
(Miron, 1986). 25 
The development  of bank vulnerability  has also been viewed 
as a "perceptual  problem."  There is evidence  in the psychological 
literature  to suggest that when a probability  reaches  some 
critically  low level, it is treated  as if it were  zero  (Guttentag 
& Herring,  1986, pp. 3,4). 
During  a long period  of expansion,  then, managements' 
assessments  of the probability  of "shocks" tends to be biased 
downward.  As a result, bankers  will take greater  risks than an 
objective  assessment,  if such were possible,  would warrant.  In 
the late 1960's, Minsky  referred to this phenomena  as "the 
economics  of euphoria,"  and, more recently,  Guttentag  and Herring 
have labeled  it "disaster myopia"  (Minsky, 1971, p. 100-103; 
Guttentag  & Herring,  1986, pp. 3-4). When vision  is cleared by 
events, many banks  are likely to be threatened  with  insolvency. 
There  is evidence  that with less capital,  excessive  risk-taking 
will be further encouraged  and that the rate of insolvency  is 
likely to rise  (Barth, Bartholomew  C Labich,  1990; Golbe  & Shull, 
1990). 
(3) Policy  Implications.  The problem  outlined  above  implies 
that bank  supervisors  need to be aware of developing  fragility; 
and, in particular,  to the growing vulnerability  of banks to both 
monetary  surprise  and other shocks during periods  of expansion. 
It is necessary  that they separate themselves  from what may seem 
the  "reasonable"  risk evaluations  of bank management  in 
developing  supervisory  policy.  The monetary  authority  needs  a 
capacity  to establish  minimum  standards  for bank condition, 26 
through  supervision,  in accordance  with the effects  of likely, 
and sometimes  abrupt,  changes  in monetary  policy.  It also needs  a 
continuous  stream of current  information  on the condition  of 
banks  in order to ascertain  the likely effects  of its policies. 
In contrast,  traditional  supervision  has not focussed  on 
identifying  vulnerable  or fragile banks  and leaning against  their 
fragility  (Minsky, 1975; Guttentag  & Herring,  1988, p.  602). 
There are reasons why bank  supervisors  might have difficulty 
doing  so. First,  they too may believe  it rational  to ignore 
potential  hazards  of low probability.  Supervisors  and bankers 
live in the same emotional  climate.  Second,  supervisory  efforts 
to strengthen  weak banks  and sustain healthy  ones focus on 
earnings  from which most new bank capital has come. Restraining 
weak, much  less seemingly  healthy, banks  in a vigorously  growing 
economy,  and in the face of unrestrained  competitors,  conflicts 
with traditional  supervisory  aims to support bank earnings  and 
not to interfere  with successful  bank management.  There  is some 
evidence  that  supervisory  myopia  has been a problem  (Guttentag & 
Herring,  1986, p. 33; Petersen,  1977, pp. 27-28). 
Political  difficulties  are also created  for a supervisory 
agency that  is sensitive  to growing  system fragility  during  long 
periods  of prosperity.  An agency that  "leans against"  the 
developing  institutional,  operational  and perceptual  changes that 
impair the system and, in particular,  what  it views  as myopic 
risk-taking,  places  itself in the way of banks  and others,  that 
literally  do not see the reasons  for supervisory  foot-dragging. 27 
The Federal  Reserve  has found itself in this position  from time- 
to-time  and has been subjected  to severe criticism.  It has been 
accused,  for example  of deferring  desirable  "innovative" 
regulatory  action to avoid controversy  that could generate 
political  opposition  to its "independence"  (C. Golumbe  as quoted 
in Horvitz,  1983, p. 259); and of using  its regulatory  authority 
in a way that  "offends one's sense of fair play  and equal 
regulatory  treatment  under the law"  (Petersen, 1977, p. 36). Bank 
associations  have sought to eliminate  the Federal  Reserve 
entirely  from a supervisory  role.  (See, for example,  Federal 
Reserve  Board,  1984, p. 551).11 
In fact, in a boom characterized  by "euphoria"  and "disaster 
myopia,"  the strength  of the criticism may be a measure  of a 
supervisory  agency's  value as a supervisor.  Despite  strong 
opposition  by banking  associations  and others,  recent government 
studies,  with the Treasury  Report being the latest, have reserved 
a supervisory  role for the Federal Reserve.  In 1984, the Task 
Group headed by then Vice President  Bush concluded  "...that the 
FRB should maintain...  supervisory  and regulatory  authority  to 
'lSuch  efforts  have  been  supported  by  some  who  suggest  that 
monetary  policy  can be executed  without  financial  regulation.  But 
such  analyses  view  the  Federal  Reserve's  supervisory  needs  as 
emerging  from  an unnecessary  role  as a creditor  at the  discount 
window  (Goodfriend  and  King,  1988),  or  from  informational 
requirements  that  can  be  satisfied  by  other  agencies  (Benston, 
1983).  In  fact,  as  discussed  above,  the  Federal  Reserve's 
distinctive  supervisory  role emerged  from  its use  of open market 
operations  and  countercyclical  policy,  not  from  discount  window 
lending.  Further,  the  information  obtained  in  the  course  of 
supervision  is needed not only inform monetary policy, but also as 
the basis  for regulatory  revision. 20 
back up its responsibilities  as the central bank  (Blueprint for 
Reform, p. 48). The conclusion  is not  unreasonable;  but,  as 
discussed  below,  it is inadequate. 
Recent  legislation  and supervisory  reform has, as noted, 
taken  some steps toward dealing with bank vulnerability,  as 
opposed  simply to existing  weakness.  Risk-adjusted  capital 
standards,  as they have developed,  are, however,  seriously 
deficient.  They apply relatively  arbitrary  weights  to individual 
assets  independently  of their contribution  to risk in each bank's 
portfolios.  They apply to book capital which may differ 
significantly  from capital based  on market values,  and they do 
not confront  the problem  of myopia  in any systematic  way. Risk- 
adjusted  deposit  insurance premiums  and interest-rate  risk 
evaluations  are at a very early stage and have yet to be tested. 
While  it is not possible  to anticipate  a particular  surprise 
or shock, more  can be done in preparation.  It is possible  to 
create accounting  systems that reveal bank exposure  to non- 
specific  events  of varying  impact that would also inform 
supervisors  and give them some leverage  in confronting  bank 
managements  (Minsky, 1971, pp. 124-29; Minsky,  1975; Guttentag  & 
Herring,  1988).  It should also be possible  to develop more 
complex models,  with regional  as well as national  banking 
sectors,  and to simulate  economic  and financial  shocks. 
The risk evaluation  approach  currently  underway  in the 
supervisory  agencies  are limited by the absence  of an explicit 
model  of the relationship  between  the banking  firm, financial 29 
markets,  real markets  and monetary  policy.  It is noteworthy  that 
even the Federal  Reserve's  elaborate  MPS model  does not include 
an explicit  banking  sector.  In the formal analysis  and 
forecasting  framework  of the Board of Governors,  the interactions 
between  monetary  policy  and bank condition  are ignored. 
B.  The  Fragmented  Regulatory  System 
The continued  existence  of multiple  regulatory  agencies 
have precluded  uniformity,  made planning  nearly  impossible  and 
diminished  accountability.  The system has repeatedly  been 
perceived  as deficient.  Unification  of Federal  bank  supervision 
was proposed  in Congress  as early as 1919, again in the  1930's, 
and on numerous  occasions  subsequently  (Robertson, 1966, p. 
686)?  Among  other things,  the system involves  overlap 
and duplication  that  is excessively  costly and imposes 
differential  costs on competing  depository  institutions 
(Blueprint for Reform,  1984, p. 29, note  16; Huston,  1985; 
Hackley,  1969). By the end of the 1970's there was both  anecdotal 
and empirical  support  for many of its short-comings  (Shull 1992; 
Hackley,  1969; Robertson,  1966). Case studies have  indicated 
conflicts  among different  regulators  with overlapping  authority 
(Shull, 1980; Huston,  1985).13 
12For  reviews  of past proposals  see U.S. Treasury  Department, 
1991,  pp.  IX-6 to  IX-8  (Treasury Report);  Blueprint  for Reform: 
Report of the Task Group on Requlation of Financial  Services,  1984, 
pp. 32-33  (Bush Report);  and Horvitz,  1982, pp. 44-45. 
13A  recent review of the arguments  on both  sides of the issue 
is provided  in Shull,  1992. 30 
In the late 1970's, the Federal Financial  Institution 
Examination  Council  (FFIEC), composed  of the heads of the five 
principal  Federal  banking  agencies  and a small staff, was 
established  to establish  uniform  standards  and to coordinate  the 
work of the five Federal  agencies.  There has yet to be a full 
evaluation  of the FFIEC.14  But without  authority  to impose 
negotiated  recommendations,  this organization  cannot be viewed  as 
a reasonable  substitute  for consolidation. 
Events  of the last decade have further exacerbated  the 
problems.  Differentially  permissive  Federal  and state regulation 
of S&Ls provides  a morbid  illustration  of destructive  regulatory 
competition  and differential  cost problems.  With excessively  lax 
S&L regulation  in the early  1980's some commercial  banks  opted to 
become  S&L's  (Isaac, 1984, pp.  1667-68). Forbearance  for 
insolvent  thrifts,  in one form or another,  and the relatively 
high rates they were willing  to pay for deposits,  injured not 
only solvent thrifts  but also commercial  banks  (Brumbaugh, 1988, 
PP. 70 ff.). 
With  an intensification  of competition,  differential 
regulatory  costs,  of necessity,  assume an increasing  importance. 
A higher probability  of bank  failure, makes  confusion  generated 
by overlaps  less acceptable.  Timely supervisory  policies  to 
assist bank  adaptation  to rapidly  changing  financial  markets, 
unburdened  by agency conflicts,  becomes  increasingly  important 
14A GAO  study  in  1984  was  critical  of  its  performance 
(Comptroller General of the U.S., 1984).For a history  of the FFIEC 
from an insider's point  of view, see Lawrence,  1992. 31 
and difficult  to achieve.  Global banking  and international 
regulatory  agency deliberations;  e.g., to establish  uniform 
capital  standards,  place new demands  on agency coordination. 
The principal  arguments  in favor of a continuation  of the 
fragmented  system has been that it promotes  regulatory 
innovation,  in particular,  deregulation,  and that  it affords  a 
check against  excessive  concentration  of regulatory  power  (Scott, 
1977). Events  have made these arguments  less important  in recent 
years.  The value  of agency competition  was higher when there were 
more anticompetitive  regulations  to erode. With  interest  rate 
restrictions  on deposits  eliminated,  branch banking  and activity 
restrictions  in process  of elimination,  the benefits  of further 
erosion  are, for the time at least, dubious.  Moreover,  it is now 
clear that the check afforded by multiple  agencies  are just one 
of several types,  including  litigation  and Congressional 
oversight,  that constrain  each regulatory  agency. For example, 
the transfer  of authority  from the Federal  Home Loan Bank Board, 
an independent  agency with exclusive  jurisdiction  over S&L's, to 
the OTS in the Treasury Department  was  justified on the basis  of 
evidence  that the Board had been excessively  "checked" by 
industry  and Congressional  pressure,  and needed to be  "insulated" 
(Greenspan, 1989, p.  6). 
The system that now exists tends,  itself, to undermine  the 
efficacy  of supervision.  First,  it has induced competing 
institutions  to seek out the most attractive  regulatory  regime, 
permitted  escape  from supervisory  restraints  imposed on 32 
individual  institutions  and, thereby,  eroded constraints  in 
general  (Burns, 1974; Shull,  1980). In addition,  it has made  it 
difficult,  if not impossible,  to achieve certain policy 
objectives  that require  cooperation.  As noted by George  Bush's 
1984 Task Group, the banking  agencies have difficulties  in 
"shared responsibilities"  and I'..  .problems of interagency 
coordination  may... (undermine) confidence  in the financial 
system"  (Blueprint for Reform,  1984, p. 31). 
Examples  of one agency's policy being  frustrated  by other 
agencies  are readily  available.  In the 1960's, the Comptroller  of 
the Currency  adopted  a distinctive  chartering,  acquisition  and 
new powers  policy;  it was frustrated,  in part, by agency 
conflict.  In the 1970's, the Federal Reserve  Board  adopted  a 
policy  aimed at restoring  competition  in local market  areas by 
restricting  market-extension  acquisitions;  it was frustrated,  in 
part, by other agencies  also having merger  and acquisition 
authority,  but with different  views on competition  (Shull, 1975, 
P* 110).  Beginning  in 1980, nonbanking  firms found it possible 
to establish  "nonbank banks" by exploiting  a "loophole"  in the 
Bank Holding  Company Act that the Comptroller,  but not the 
Federal  Reserve,  was willing  to accommodate.  It required  roughly 
7 years of Congressional  deliberations  before  further nonbank 
bank acquisitions  were prohibited  by the Competitive  Equality 
Banking Act  of 1987. Thus, major  changes  in banking  structure 
have also resulted  from divided  authority  and agency  conflict. 33 
The fragmented  system may, moreover,  result  in some 
important  issues not being  addressed  at all. The deficiencies  of 
the  "too-big-to-fail"  policies  of the Federal  Reserve  and FDIC 
are now reasonably  clear. But because  of divided merger  and 
acquisition  authority,  no one agency has been  in a position  to 
prevent  new banks  from becoming  "too-big-to-fail."  In fact, no 
agency has ever proposed  to incorporate  this consideration  into 
its merger  and acquisition  standards. As noted,  a proper  focus on 
the macro problems  confronting  banks  suggests the need to develop 
analyses  that  increases  supervisory  awareness  of institutional 
vulnerabilities.  Of the agencies,  only the Federal  Reserve 
appears  to be clearly  aware of the problem  (Federal Reserve 
Board,  1984). But none have dealt with it effectively. 
As a practical  matter,  we should expect the agencies  to 
focus on what can be accomplished  and generally  disregard  what  is 
beyond  their  capacity.  In the absence of unification,  capacity  is 
limited  and important  issues fall through the cracks. 
At the practical  level, the effects  of agency differences 
can spill over from one group of banks to another. A recent  staff 
report of the House Banking  Committee  contended  that national 
banks had imposed a disproportionate  drain on the Federal  deposit 
insurance  fund because  of supervisory  deficiencies  of the 
Comptroller  of the Currency  (Staff Report,  1991).15  Other banks 
15The  House Banking Committee's Staff Report is highly critical 
of OCC  supervision.  The Comptroller  of the  Currency  disputed  the 
findings  of  the  Staff  Report,  but  simultaneously  announced  the 
expected  hiring  of  300  new  examiners  over  the  next  two  years 
(Clarke, 1991). 34 
would be affected  even if their condition  and their  supervisors 
were superior. 
Under the dual banking  system, banks have been able to 
choose the most  attractive  (least costly)  supervisory  domain. 
Even  if there were no overlaps,  with each supervisory  agency 
confined  to a separate depository  institutions,  a competition 
among supervisors  to attract banks would exist. Arthur  Burns 
believed  that  such competition  promoted  laxity;  i.e., a 
relaxation  of supervisory  restrictions  to attract  "constituents" 
(Burns, 1975). 
The fragmented  system, moreover,  attacks  its own 
effectiveness  and legitimacy.  Agency  competition,  if not agency 
differences  alone,  imply that supervision  is arbitrary;  and 
supervisors  can, therefore,  be viewed  as capricious  in insisting 
on any particular  set of rules. Evading  supervision  and 
regulation  takes  on the character  of an activity  for which the 
social consequences  are trivial. 
Some of the problems  of the fragmented  system may be 
attenuated  by the growing uniformity  of Federal  regulation, 
limitation  on supervisory  discretion,  and the extension  of the 
new rules to state banks.  But to the extent this development  is 
effective,  it leaves the existing  agencies  as artifacts.  And  it 
does not integrate  supervision  and monetary  policy. 
C. Insider  Abuse  and  Criminal  Misconduct:  Opportunism 35 
In recent years, there has been a substantial  increase  in 
insider abuse and criminal misconduct  in banking.16  The growth 
is evidenced  in Congressional  reports, written  orders by 
regulatory  authorities,  criminal  referrals,  civil suits, and the 
expansion  of bank examination  staffs and costs  (Fraud in 
America's  Insured Depository  Institutions,  1991; Seidman,  1990; 
Federal  Response  to Criminal Misconduct,  1984). Over the last 
decade,  the number  of criminal  referrals  to the Justice 
Department  by the supervisory  agencies have risen dramatically. 
In 1986, the Justice Department  notified  all U.S. attorneys  that 
fraud in the banking  industry was a national  priority.  The number 
of failed  financial  institutions  with ongoing FBI investigations 
have  increased  each year since 1986  (Effectiveness of Law 
Enforcement  Aoainst  Financial  Crime,  1990, pp. 397-98,  444). The 
legislative  response  has been to establish  more extensive 
supervision  and harsher penalties. 
Widespread  insider abuse and criminal misconduct  constitutes 
a substantial  burden  on supervision.  Like any form of appraisal, 
supervision  is simpler when those being  appraised  recognize  the 
legitimacy  of the evaluation,  believe  it is of benefit  to them, 
view themselves  as participants  with common  interests,  and 
16The  term  "insider  abuse"  refers  to  a  wide  range  of 
"misconduct"  by  officers,  directors  and  other  insiders  of 
depository  institutions  for  purposes  of  personal  enrichment, 
without regard to the safety and soundness of the institution,  and 
in violation  of civil banking  laws or regulations  and/or  criminal 
banking  laws.  "Criminal  misconduct"  ("fraud") refers  to  criminal 
acts  committed  by  "insiders"  for  the  same  purpose.  (Federal 
Response  to Criminal  Misconduct,  1984, p. 2). 36 
generally  govern  their  institutions  with an attitude  of 
"stewardship.""  It is more difficult  when those being  appraised 
are intent on distortion  and obfuscation.  There has,  from time- 
to-time,  been a sense of stewardship  among bankers  that has been 
encouraged  by supervisors.'*  The upsurge  in misconduct  can be 
viewed  as an institutional  failure. 
There has been no definitive  study of the causes 
increase  in misconduct  in banking.  But some plausible 
suggested  within  a "contractual"  framework. 
for an 
ones may be 
Bank  regulation  may be viewed  as a "contract."  The 
government-bank  relationship  is permeated  by mutuality. 
Depository  institutions  receive the "privilege"  of offering 
liabilities  payable  on demand that serve as "money" and also 
government  support  of various types.  The government  obtains  a 
stable supply of banking  services  for itself and for other 
politically  influential  groups.  The underlying  basis  for the 
exchange  has historically  involved both a shift in risk from 
17Stewardship  has  been  defined  as  a  involving  a  trust 
relationship  in which the word of a party can be taken as its bond 
(Williamson, 1975, p. 26); it suggests some degree of self-denial, 
at least in the short-run,  and obedience  to rules. 
I*  An explicit example of an older supervisory  attitude urging 
bankers to abide by the rules and to exercise self-restraint  can be 
found in a 19th Century  circular  lettery sent by Comptroller  Hugh 
McCulloch to each national bank. "Every banker...(should)  feel that 
the reputation  of the system..  -depends on the manner  in which his 
particular  institution  is  conducted.. ..Never  be  tempted  by  the 
prospect  of  large  returns  to  do  anything  but  what  be  properly 
done....'  Splendid  financiering'  is  not  legitimate  banking,  and 
'splendid  financiers'  in banking  are generally  humbug  or rascals" 
(as quoted  in Kane,  1922, pp. 29-30). 37 
banks to the government  (taxpayers), and government  efforts  to 
control  its exposure. 
This continuing  exchange  suggests the existence  of a 
contract  that can be characterized  as:  (1)  long-term,  (2) 
incomplete,  and  (3)  with important  implicit elements  (Goldberg, 
1976, pp. 427-29; Williamson  1985, Ch. 2).  The long-term  nature 
of the banking  contract  is reflected  in charters  of indefinite 
duration;  it is incomplete  in the sense that neither  law nor 
regulation  can spell out precisely  how banks  and regulators  will 
behave  in all possible  circumstances.  The implicit  elements 
include  informal  "understandings"  about behavior,  and 
particularly,  but not exclusively,  in the face of unspecified 
contingencies  (such as exogenous  shock) that affect the net 
benefits  of both parties.  The relationship  that supports  such 
cooperation  can be traced to the first chartered  banks  in the 
U.S. that were organized  on the Bank of England  (17th Century) 
model. As noted above, they were considered  "private 
establishments  employed  as public  agents." 
Long-term  contracts  with implicit elements  invariably  create 
concerns  among parties  about each other's good faith performance. 
In banking,  the complexity  of the transactions  and the potential 
for false reporting  creates  a particular  problem.  Hiding 
information,  distorting  and lying, to say nothing  of stealing, 
cheating  and embezzling,  needs to be controlled  by a proper 
structuring  of incentives  and/or  in other ways. This type of 
behavior,  has been  referred to as "profit seeking with guile," 38 
and termed  "opportunism."  It has been contrasted  with simple 
profit  maximization,  within the established  rules, and 
with stewardship  (Williamson, 1985, pp. 47-49; and 1975, p. 
26)-l' 
Concerns  about deceit  and guile are reflected  in vague bank 
regulatory  requirements  such as "meeting fiduciary  duties"  and 
"protecting  safety and soundness."  Such terms are not subject, ex 
ante, to precise  definition;  and even ex post are frequently 
difficult  to evaluate.  They support, however,  a necessary 
understanding  that bankers  will curb opportunistic  behavior;  and 
they do give regulatory  agencies  a legal basis  for proceeding 
against banks  that are perceived  in violation.  Experience 
suggests that the government  and supervisory  agencies  are also 
expected  to act in good faith in adjusting  laws and regulations 
to changing  circumstances  that create unexpected  difficulties  for 
banks,  and to honor  its informal pledges  of ad hoc support. 
The increase  in misconduct  that has developed  has paralleled 
the deterioration  of the old regulatory  arrangement  that had been 
established  in the  1930's. The changes over the period  of 
"deregulation"  placed  enormous pressures  on banks,  as reflected 
in the S&L debacle,  the high rate of commercial  bank  failure  and 
the low levels of profits  in recent years. 
The good faith of the government  may be questioned,  as it 
was in the early  1980's when the Federal Reserve's  anti-inflation 
"For  any one individual,  these types of behavior  need not be 
taken as mutually  exclusive  over time; nor need one, the other or 
some blend be uniform  across an entire  industry. 39 
policy  produced  interest  rate levels and volatility  that,  for 
S&L'S, created  a "financial  holocaust"  (Gray, 1984, p.  1598).*' 
Risk-taking  incentives  emanating  from Federal  deposit  insurance 
and other elements  of the safety net have existed  since their 
inception.  But with a reduction  in charter values  resulting  from 
an intensification  of competition,  a counterweight  appears  to 
have been  removed  (Keeley, 1990). In these circumstances, 
stewardship  may  simply be untenable. 
The transition  to opportunism  can be viewed  as including 
increased  incentives  and lowered costs.  In the market  environment 
that existed  in the 1980's, the potential  gains  from 
misreporting,  distortion,  violating  restrictions,  etc.,  appear to 
have been enormous  compared to the potential  gains  from abiding 
by the rules. Opportunistic  activities,  of course,  involve  risks, 
and are sometimes  equated  to risk-taking  within the  "rules." But 
the identification  is not complete,  either  conceptually  or with 
regard to the effect  on the institutions  involved.*' 
Conventional  risk-taking  is associated  with higher  expected 
profits  for the institution  and might or might not be associated 
with an increased  probability  of insolvency.  Misconduct  would 
always be associated  with lower expected  (true) profits  for the 
*'Brumbaugh  states: "In October 1979, the Federal Reserve made 
a  decision  with  ruinous  results  for  the  thrift  industry.  The 
Federal Reserve changed from a policy of stabilizing  interest rates 
to...  slowing money  growth  rates to combat  inflation.  This lead to 
.  .  . an  unprecidented  increase  in thrifts'  costs...  with  almost  no 
corresponding  increase  in revenues....(Brumbaugh,  1988, p.15). 
*IFor  a  discussion  of  the  conceptual  differences,  see 
Williamson,  1985, pp.  64-67. 40 
institution  and an increased probability  of insolvency.  For 
example,  "lending" excessive  amounts to associates  on the basis 
of inflated  collateral  values would have the effect  of producing 
bad  loans,  likely to be hidden  on financial  statements,  and, 
thereby  reduce expected profits  and capital.  The institution's 
risk may also be increased  indirectly by reducing  asset 
diversification,  without  any increased profit  expectation. 
A principal  difference  between  risk-taking  within  and 
outside the rules, then, relates to the expected  future of the 
institution.  The conventional  risk-taker  knows that there  is a 
chance that the institution  will fail; but also that there  is a 
chance  it will succeed  and prosper.  The abusive  risk-taker  knows 
that,  in the long-run,  the institution  has no chance at all." 
While  restraints  on opportunistic  behavior  may have weakened 
with the disorganization  of the old regulatory  arrangements, 
other factors  appear  simultaneously  to have made opportunism 
"safer;"  i.e., the expected  cost of discovery  lower. First,  the 
demand  on supervisory  resources  has been  increasing  as the result 
of increased  numbers  of problem  banks, bank  failures,  and mergers 
(Comptroller General  of the U.S.,  1984, p. 74). In addition,  much 
of the deregulation  that has occurred  in recent years has been 
"Regulatory  forbearance  encourages  conventional  risk-taking 
by permitting  bank managers  to operate with little or no capital. 
But  this  does  not  directly  encourage  opportunistic  risk-taking; 
penalties  for misconduct  do not increase as capital is reduced.  If 
forbearance  encourages  misconduct,  it  does  so  by  keeping  open 
institutions  run by  opportunistic  managers.  Opportunism  may  also 
extend  to  political  activity  that  delays  closure  of  insolvent 
institutions  and would, therefore,  tend to promote  risk-taking  of 
both types. 41 
conditional.  From a supervisory  point  of view  "just say no" is 
less demanding  than  "yes on condition."  The latter requires  far 
more careful monitoring.  Despite  growth  in resources,  supervision 
may,  at any point  in time, be insufficient.  Finally,  while the 
capacity  for misreporting  and distortion  has always been great  in 
banking.  growth  in the complexity  of markets,  instruments  and 
banking  institutions  has probably  make  it easier to escape 
detection. 
Opportunism  among bankers  tends to compromise  supervision. 
Supervisors  become  torn between  their obligations  to support bank 
profitability  and to prevent  dubious practices  which,  ex ante, 
are not obviously  abusive,  and which  seem to contribute  to 
profitability.  In periods  of prosperity,  they may be reluctant  to 
substitute  their  judgement  for that of bank management,  and 
reluctant  to restrict the banks they supervise  when their 
competitors,  supervised  by others, are not restricted.  In times 
of bank distress,  difficulties  arise for the same underlying 
reason. Moreover,  when supervisors  are confronted  with banks  at 
or near insolvency,  they become understandably  anxious  to find 
buyers  who will inject new capital.  The S&L experience  of the 
1980's  suggests that  standards  for evaluating  the character  of 
new owners  can suffer in the anxiety to find investors. 
Recent  legislation,  like FIRREA  and FDICIA,  have attempted 
to make the expected  cost of discovery  much greater.  They may 
also be steps in the process  of establishing  a new regulatory 
contract.  But the process  is not yet complete.  It remains to be 42 
seen just what effect more  supervision  and harsher  penalties  have 
in and of themselves. 
IV. COMPETENCE 
Given the problems  of supervision  and its track  record,  it 
is reasonable  to ask whether  supervisors  are sufficiently 
competent.  This question  needs to be considered  on two levels. 
First,  are supervisors  competent  to do what they have 
traditionally  been  assigned to do; i.e., to appraise  the 
condition  of banks  at a point  in time,  identify weak institutions 
and institute  corrections  as needed.  Second, even if they are, 
can they prevent  system-wide  periodic  deterioration  in safety and 
soundness  of the banks they supervise. 
There  is evidence  to suggest that supervisors  have been 
reasonably  successful  in identifying  weak institutions,  but  less 
successful  in correcting  their problems  (For some earlier 
evidence  on this point,  see Comptroller  General  of the U.S., 
1977, Ch. 4). Oversight  by Congressional  banking  committees  has 
resulted  in severe criticism  from time-to-time;  e.g.,  in the 
cases of the Continental  Bank insolvency,  failure of the United 
American  Bank  (and other banks  controlled  by Jake Butcher),  and 
more  recently  in the case of the Bank of New England.  However, 
criticism  has typically  been directed  toward  sluggishness  in 
supervisory  reaction  after weaknesses  have been uncovered. 
There  is reason to believe  that, as a general matter, 
supervisors,  with  some notable  exceptions,  would be competent  to 43 
detect trouble  as it develops.  Those that head the principal 
agencies  are well educated  in business  and, some in law. They 
have had successful  careers  as bankers,  in bank examinations  or 
the legal departments  of the regulatory  agencies.  Their staffs 
have similar backgrounds,  for the most part with  less experience. 
Training  at the regulatory  agencies  appears to have become 
reasonably  sophisticated  in the areas of financial markets  and 
financial  analysis. 
Failure  to effectively  implement  remedies  is evidenced  by a 
long list of floundering  institutions  that have ultimately 
failed. Over the past decade, troubled  banks have  imposed 
enormous  costs on the insurance  funds. Supervision  has been 
condemned  for yielding  to political  and industry pressure. 
Supervisors  have been modeled  as subordinating  the public 
interest to their  own career  interests.  It has been Congressional 
distrust  of supervision,  based  on recent experience,  that has 
resulted  in constraints  on supervisory  discretion  and the 
establishment  of tripwires  requiring  intervention. 
Whether  of not the curtailment  of supervisory  discretion  and 
the substitution  of rules will improve supervisory  performance 
remains to be seen. If the only aim of supervision  was protection 
of the insurance  funds, the new rules, or some variant,  might 
serve well. But traditional  supervision  is also designed  to 
conserve banks  as going concerns  and it is not clear that the 
current  approach  will facilitate  this aim. 44 
Supervisory  competence  can be questioned  at another  level. 
Even if supervisors  are competent  in identifying  weak 
institutions,  and the new rules for intervention  are successful 
in protecting  the deposit  insurance  funds, problems  will remain. 
Supervisors  are not competent,  at present,  to resist the 
pressures  toward  increasing  fragility during periods  of 
expansion.  The institutional  failures of the current  system would 
strain the most competent  agency  in developing  and implementing 
appropriate  policies.  The new rules could, moreover,  impose 
draconian  measures  in a financial  crisis. 
Supervisors  have not dealt effectively  with these problems 
in the past,  and there  is nothing  in the recent  legislation  that 
suggests they will come to grips with them in the future.  It is 
reasonable  to infer that they cannot. 
v.  POLICY 
The problems  faced by supervision  are interrelated  and 
reinforcing.  These include an economic problem  involving  monetary 
surprises  and exogenous  shocks. The fragmentation  of regulatory 
system makes  the development  and implementation  of reasonable 
polices  almost  impossible.  An increase  in opportunistic  behavior 
has made effective  supervision  considerably  more difficult.  The 
supervisory  establishment  does not appear capable  of dealing  with 
the economic  and institutional  problems  that tend to undermine 
its best efforts. 45 
Given the proper  circumstances,  it might be possible  to deal 
with the economic  problem.  But it is far more difficult  to do so 
when authority  is divided  and opportunism  drains  substantial 
resources.  Any  solution to the difficulties  has to begin with 
unification  of the regulatory  structure.  It is not possible  to 
develop  and implement  appropriate  policies  with numerous  quasi- 
independent  supervisory  agencies  for competitive  depository 
institutions.  It is certainly  more difficult  to "lean against 
fragility"  when other supervisory  agencies  are not. This implies 
that there  is a need to work toward coordination  and unification 
of policies.  It is necessary,  moreover,  to integrate  supervision 
more  fully with monetary  policy. As discussed,  the impact of 
monetary  policy  on the condition  of banks  is such that  it makes 
no sense to view  supervision  and central banking  as separate 
functions.  Monetary  policy  as it has been conducted  and is likely 
to be implemented  in the future, requires the authority  to 
evaluate  and influence  the condition  of commercial  banks. 
Consolidation  within  the Federal  Reserve,  or within  a new agency 
that  incorporates  the monetary  authority,  is needed. 
A second  step is a fuller integration  of supervision  with 
economic  analysis  that goes beyond  early warning  to potential 
vulnerabilities.  Efforts  toward this end seem to be underway. 
Integration  would  facilitate  these efforts  and produce  the kinds 
of information  that arm supervisors  to "lean against  fragility." 
A third  step is to raise the level of qualification  and 
expectation  for the top supervisory  officials.  With expanded 46 
goals,  supervision  should command  leadership  of the first rank, 
no less qualified  in economic  and financial market  analysis  than 
Federal  Reserve  Board chairmen. Notwithstanding  the qualities 
that  some high  level supervisors  bring to the  job, they have been 
insufficient  to deal with the problems  supervision  must deal with 
if it is to be successful.  The integration  of central banking  and 
supervision  would help produce  this result. 
To the extent possible,  it is necessary  to reestablish  a 
reasonable  regulatory  contract.  It would be of considerable  help 
if stewardship  behavior  could be promoted.  What  can be done, 
however,  in a relatively  deregulated,  competitive  and rapidly 
changing banking  system is unclear. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Supervision  has repeatedly  failed in preventing 
recurrent  episodes  of systemic deterioration  in bank  safety and 
soundness.  The solution,  repeatedly  endorsed by Congress,  with 
the support  of supervisors,  has been to augment  supervision  and 
improve the quality  of bank management.  Because periods  of 
systemic  fragility  typically  occur after long intervals  of 
seeming  successful  bank operations,  each episode  appears  to occur 
independently  of the ones that preceded  it. 
We are now in a period  of supervisory  augmentation  that  is 
focusing  on what happened  during the last decade.  This focus is, 
at best,  distorted  because  it does not consider  why  "improved 
supervision"  has repeatedly  failed. 47 
As in most  cases of repeated  failure, there exist  systemic 
problems  that produce  inherent  limitations.  For supervision,  the 
problems  include monetary  surprises  and exogenous  shocks, the 
effects  of which  seems only dimly appreciated.  The fragmentation 
of regulatory  system undermines  the development  of reasonable 
polices.  And,  in recent years,  an upsurge  in opportunistic 
behavior  has confused  supervisory  efforts  and drained  resources. 
Supervisors  appear competent  to uncover  weak banks,  but not to 
deal with their  inherent  limitations. 
To correct the difficulties,  it would  first be necessary  to 
unify the regulatory  agencies  and integrate them with monetary 
policy,  either  in the Federal Reserve  or in a new institution 
that  included monetary  policy  authority.  Such a consolidation 
would  almost  invariably  produce  a research  initiative  to develop 
a better  understanding  of the interrelationship  between  macro- 
economic policy,  economic  and financial markets  and the condition 
of banks.  This elevation  of supervision,  as a component,  of 
banking  policy,  implies an upgrading  of top officials  whose 
background  and experience  should be, at a minimum,  on par with 
what is currently  expected  of Federal Reserve  Board  chairmen.  And 
this implies  a better  chance of dealing  successfully  with the 
enormous  difficulties  that supervision  confronts. 48 
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